SARG04 with other prepare-and-measure QKD protocols using decoy states.
Quantum key distribution (QKD)
1, 2 offers information-theoretic security for two authorized users, Alice and Bob, when communicating secret information along an insecure quantum channel, while the laws of quantum mechanics bound the behavior of an eavesdropper [3] [4] [5] [6] . Since its introduction in 1984 by Bennett and Brassard 1 , QKD has experienced great advances both theoretically [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] and experimentally [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] , and has become the most mature quantum information technology for commercial use 19 . The study of QKD today is driven by the necessity to close the gap between its theory and practice, as experimental systems tend to differ remarkably from their simplified mathematical models, and any of these deviations may open doors to new attacks from Eve to compromise security. Some of Eve's eavesdropping techniques include simple individual attacks and Trojan-horse attacks, which one can overcome by investigating the bounds of information leakage in different scenarios and apply the suitable amount of privacy amplification to obtain the final secure key 20 . Other side-channel attacks, such as detector blinding attacks 21 and time-shift attack 22 that base on specific device imperfections, require more complicated QKD settings than the original BB84 to retrieve security again. Hence the measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] and device-independent (DI) QKD [33] [34] [35] were developed to combat these experimental flaws.
Compared with the entanglement-based QKD protocols, prepare-and-measure QKD protocols are widely studied. The photon-number distribution of weak coherent states is Poisson distribution, which contains a fraction of multiphoton components. However, exploiting photon-added coherent states 36 , one can acquire large probabilities of single-photon, twophoton, three-photon or four-photon component. For the BB84 protocol, the single-photon source is usually replaced by weak coherent states, which suffer from the photon number splitting (PNS) attack 37 . The PNS attack, in which Eve blocks all single photon pulses and splits multiphoton pulses, results from the experimental variation of replacing the single photon sources from the original BB84 protocol with practical attenuated lasers. In this situation, Eve would forward some portion of multiphoton pulses to Bob through a lossless channel while keeping the rest to herself in the quantum memory [38] [39] [40] , and measure her photons after receiving the basis reconciliation information obtained via Alice and Bob's public communication.
The security basis of QKD provided by single photon pulses was guaranteed by the no-cloning theorem 41 , and thus this attack was regarded as a major threat to QKD and has been extensively studied 37 . Two major counter methods have been proposed. One is the decoy state method [42] [43] [44] , which is a powerful method devised to analyze rigorously the extractible secret key rate from the single-photon component of signal states, though its implementations would differ slightly from the prepare-and-measure setup [45] [46] [47] . To overcome this attack at a protocol level, the SARG04 QKD protocol 48 , which differs from the BB84 only in the classical postprocessing part 49, 50 , was proposed. In the SARG04 protocol, the reconciliation information is a pair of nonorthogonal states, which cannot be perfectly distinguished and can be able to address the PNS attack 48 . Subsequently, this prepare-and-measure SARG04 protocol was further investigated and ingeniously converted to an unconditionally secure entanglement distillation protocol (EDP) by Tamaki and Lo 51 , who showed that by exploiting the same arguments of Shor and Preskill 4 , SARG04 protocol possesses the unique ability to extract the secure key from not only the single-photon component but also two-photon component 51, 52 . This opens the interesting question that under certain modifications of the original BB84 protocol, how the secret key can be extracted from multiphoton states. The SARG04 protocol has been widely investigated in theories [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] and experiments 57, 58 . Similarly to the MDIQKD protocol, which was proposed to make BB84 protocol naturally immune to all side-channel attacks on detectors, the SARG04 protocol in MDI setting has been considered likewise 59 . 48, 52 , and roundrobin differential phase-shift (RRDPS) QKD protocols [61] [62] [63] in the same situation.
Results
Six-state SARG04 QKD protocol. In this section, we introduce the six-state SARG04 QKD protocol with ν-photon (ν ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}) source. In this protocol, there are six polarization en- Bob, and Bob calculates the bit error rate to test for eavesdroppers. If the bit error rate is much higher than the upper bound, they abort the protocol. They perform error correction and privacy amplification on the remaining bit string to obtain the shared secret key.
A virtual EDP-based six-state SARG04 protocol. To estimate phase error for privacy amplification, one can construct an equivalent EDP version of the six-state SARG04 protocol.
First, we introduce some notations. {|0 x , |1 x } and {|0 z , |1 z } are the eigenstates for X and
is a π/2 rotation around the
axis. In the EDP-ν protocol,
Alice prepares many pairs of qubits in the state Ψ
where 
where e p and e b are the phase error rate and bit error rate, respectively. a is the probability that both bit flip and phase shift occur, which restricts the mutual information between phase error and bit error. For the case of a two-photon source, the relationship can be given by
For the case with a three-photon source, the error rates can be written as
For the case with a four-photon source, the error rates are calculated by
where
Now we reexamine the four-state SARG04 QKD protocol 51, 52 , and we find that the mutual information between bit error and phase error of a two-photon source is not zero. The expression can be given by
from which we can see that this phase error rate formula is the same as the result in ref. 51 .
The secure key rate of the EDP-based QKD using one-way classical communication can be given by
is the binary Shannon entropy, H(e p |e b ) is the conditional Shannon entropy function shown in the Methods section. We calculate the secure key rates versus the bit error rates for the six-state SARG04 QKD protocol with single-photon, two-photon, three-photon and four-photon sources, as shown in Fig. 1 . For comparison, we also calculate the secure key rate versus bit error rate for BB84 protocol 4 , six-state protocol 64 , and four-state SARG04 QKD protocol 51 . For the six-state SARG04 QKD protocol, one can extract the secure key rate from ν-photon component when the bit error rate is no larger than 11.235% For the phase randomized weak coherent state sources 65 , we study the secure key rate with infinite decoy states [42] [43] [44] , which can be given by
where Q n is the gain of the n-photon signal states which can be estimated by the decoy-state method; e pn (e bn ) is the phase (bit) error for the n-photon state; Q µ and E µ are, respectively, the total gain and quantum bit error rate under signal states with µ intensity, and can both be acquired directly through the experiment. We execute a numerical simulation to study its performance, as shown in Fig. 2 . In our simulation, we use the following parameters: the detection efficiency is η d = 43%, the dark count rate of each pulse is p dark = 1 × 10 −7 , and the intrinsic loss coefficient of standard telecom fibre is α = 0.2dB/km. These values are adopted from the 200km MDIQKD experiment data 16 . We also set the misalignment error rate to e d = 0.5%, the efficiency of error correction is f = 1.16. For comparison, we also
give the secure key rates of BB84 QKD protocol 43 , four-state SARG04 QKD protocol 52 , and the RRDPS QKD protocol 61 with the case of infinite decoy states. As shown in Fig. 2(a) , the secure transmission distance of the six-state SARG04 QKD protocol is more than 270km, farther than the four-state SARG04 QKD protocol because of the higher bit error rate threshold in the six-state SARG04 QKD protocol. The case of finite decoy states is considered in the Fig.   2(b) . By exploiting one weak decoy state and vacuum state, one can extract the secure key from single-photon component (see Methods). However, the secure key rate and secure transmission distance of the six-state and four-state SARG04 QKD protocol are all smaller than those of BB84 protocol since the bit error rate of BB84 protocol is small and the efficiency of basis shift is high 52 . Meanwhile, since the security of RRDPS QKD does not rely on signal disturbance monitoring, in our case where e d is low, the secure key of RRDPS QKD is much lower than qubit-based QKD protocols.
Discussion
For each QKD protocol, how to extract as much secure key as possible is a critical task. Here, we present the exact relations between the phase error and bit error as well as the mutual information parameters with single-photon, two-photon, three-photon, and four-photon sources.
Through restricting the mutual information, we have obtained higher bit error rate thresholds of three-photon, four-photon six-state SARG04 and two-photon four-state SARG04 QKD protocol. In the quantum digital signature protocol with k + 1-participant 60, 66 (one signer and k recipients), the signer will prepares k copies of quantum states and send a copy of quantum states to each recipient through the insecure quantum channel. To guarantee the security against the forgery attack of untruthful recipient, the honest recipient needs to estimate the information leak of his received quantum states, which will correlate to the phase error rate of QKD with k-photon sources. The security analysis of the four-state and six-state SARG04 QKD protocol with two-photon sources has been used for the three-participants quantum digital signature 60 .
Similarly, we can expect that the security analysis of the six-state SARG04 QKD protocol with three and four-photon sources can also be used for the four-participant and five-participant quantum digital signature.
Methods
The six-state SARG04 protocol with single-photon source. We consider the following four orthogonal Bell states
Alice prepares the initial quantum state Ψ
. If Eve performs no attacks and Bob does a successful filtering operation, the quantum state shared by Alice and Bob can be given by
Here, we consider that Eve can perform the most general attack on all qubits transmitted through the insecure quantum channel. By tracing out all other qubits, we can focus on one qubit state.
Let ρ qubit represent a pair of qubit states that Alice and Bob share after Eve's attack, which can be given by
where l ∈ {0, 1, 2}, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, and
any quantum state in the form of a bipartite density matrix can be expressed by the Bell-basis diagonal states. From Eq. (25), we can see that the Bell state |Φ + is a reference state. Thus, we have
representing the probabilities of only bit flip, only phase shift, both bit flip and phase shift, respectively. Therefore, the probabilities of bit flip and phase shift can be given by
Let p fil = Tr[ρ qubit ] represent the trace value of state ρ qubit . One can clearly see that 
The six-state SARG04 protocol with multiphoton sources. In the case of two-photon, for each quantum state prepared by Alice, the density matrix of quantum state shared by Alice and Bob after Eve's attack can be given by
where l ∈ {0, 1, 2}, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, u ∈ {0, 1} and
E B is a 4 × 4 matrix which depends on Eve's operation on the two-photon qubit and we can safely assume that the final state of Eve's system is a particular state |0 x . A fil , A bit , A ph , and
In the case of three-photon, for each quantum state prepared by Alice, the density matrix of quantum state shared by Alice and Bob after Eve's attack can be given by
where l ∈ {0, 1, 2}, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, u ∈ {0, 1}, v ∈ {0, 1} and
E B is a 8 ×8 matrix which depends on Eve's operation on the three-photon qubit. is a 1 × 16 vector.
In the case of four-photon, for each quantum state prepared by Alice, the density matrix of quantum state shared by Alice and Bob after Eve's attack can be given by
where l ∈ {0, 1, 2}, k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, u ∈ {0, 1}, v ∈ {0, 1}, s ∈ {0, 1} and
Since the photons of Eve's system are identical, considering their symmetry, we have 
where Y n is the yield of n-photon. In this simulation, we use the case where Eve does not interfere with the protocol. For the BB84 protocol, the Y n and e bn can be given by
−αD/10 is the channel transmittance, and D is the distance of optical fibre. For the RRDPS protocol, the Y n and e bn can be given by [61] [62] [63] 
where L is the number of pulses of each block. For the four-state SARG04 protocol, the Y n and e bn can be given by
For the six-state SARG04 protocol, the Y n and e bn can be given by
For the case with infinite decoy states, one can use the Eqs. (25)- (28) to directly calculate the yield and bit error rate of n-photon component 43, 44 . For the case with finite decoy states, we must estimate the lower bound of yield Y 
One can also exploit four intensities 60 
For more photon components, the analytical method will become very complex to calculate the yield and bit error rate. However, the linear programming 25 is a good method. To estimate the yield and bit error rate of n-photon, one can use n + 2 kinds of intensities. Since the probability of multiphoton components is very small in the weak coherent state sources, we simply consider the single-photon component contribution using one signal state, one weak decoy state and vacuum state. The intensity of weak decoy state is 0.1 and the intensity of signal state is optimal for each distance. For comparison, we set the number of pulses of each block L = 10, since the phase error rate is n/(L − 1) for n-photon in the RRDPS QKD protocol 61 . It means that we can extract the secure key from single-photon, two-photon, three-photon and four-photon components for RRDPS QKD protocol. (b) Plot of secure key rate versus fibre channel transmission for various QKD protocols with one weak decoy state and vacuum state.
